Post-Cartesian Paradigm Shift
Illustrations of the Post-Cartesian paradigm shift in philosophy and science
Exhibit A: Richard Rorty, Philosopher
“By the 1970s, it became clear that he did not have much sympathy for analytic philosophy either, not to mention the entire Cartesian philosophical tradition that held there was a world independent of thought.”
“Richard Rorty, Philosopher, Dies at 75” By PATRICIA COHEN, June 11, 2007, N.Y.Times
Exhibit B: Neurocognition
Although several theorists have underlined the importance of action in cognition (e.g. Gibson, 1966; Merleau-Ponty, [1945]1962; Piaget & Inhelder, [1966]1969), action and cognition are mostly studied as separate domains. This can be regarded as a reflection of traditional ‘Cartesian’ or ‘orthodox’ cognitive science. Mind and body are fundamentally different entities in this framework although they closely interact with one another. This strong metaphysical divide has led to the common notion that cognition is separated from action (see Clark, 1997; Noe & Thompson, 2002; van Gelder, 1995; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; Wheeler, 2005 for discussion). Consequently, language – as a sub-domain of cognition – and action have also been studied as distinct faculties of the mind (Fodor, 1983). From an embodied cognition viewpoint, however, contrary to the classical Cartesian view, the importance of bodily processes for cognition is central.
Willems, RM, and Peter Hagoort
Neural evidence for the interplay between language, gesture, and action: A review.
Brain and Language, 101 (2007) 278-289.
Exhibit A: Richard Rorty, Philosopher
“By the 1970s, it became clear that he did not have much sympathy for analytic philosophy either, not to mention the entire Cartesian philosophical tradition that held there was a world independent of thought.”
“Richard Rorty, Philosopher, Dies at 75” By PATRICIA COHEN, June 11, 2007, N.Y.Times
Exhibit B: Neurocognition
Although several theorists have underlined the importance of action in cognition (e.g. Gibson, 1966; Merleau-Ponty, [1945]1962; Piaget & Inhelder, [1966]1969), action and cognition are mostly studied as separate domains. This can be regarded as a reflection of traditional ‘Cartesian’ or ‘orthodox’ cognitive science. Mind and body are fundamentally different entities in this framework although they closely interact with one another. This strong metaphysical divide has led to the common notion that cognition is separated from action (see Clark, 1997; Noe & Thompson, 2002; van Gelder, 1995; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; Wheeler, 2005 for discussion). Consequently, language – as a sub-domain of cognition – and action have also been studied as distinct faculties of the mind (Fodor, 1983). From an embodied cognition viewpoint, however, contrary to the classical Cartesian view, the importance of bodily processes for cognition is central.
Willems, RM, and Peter Hagoort
Neural evidence for the interplay between language, gesture, and action: A review.
Brain and Language, 101 (2007) 278-289.
Labels: neurocognition, post-cartesian, Rorty
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